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Regulation of Attorney Debt
Collectors-The Role of the FTC
and the Bart
By WAYNE K. LEwIs*
In 1977 Congress enacted the first comprehensive federal debt collection statute, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).' Congress drafted the FDCPA in response to the pervasive abuses
associated with debt collection practices, 2 the high social costs of those
abuses,3 and the inadequacy of existing laws and procedures to redress
the resulting injuries. 4 The FDCPA prohibits a broad range of practices, including the use of any false or deceptive means to collect a
debt5 ; communications with third parties concerning a debt 6; harassment, threats of violence, and the use of obscene or profane language;
and threats of any action that the collector neither intends nor is authorized by law to take.8 Additionally, the debt collector must provide
written notice to the debtor concerning the obligation, 9 must verify the
debt if requested to do so by the debtor,' 0 and must cease any communications with the debtor not expressly provided for in the statute if the
t
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1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1982) [hereinafter cited as FDCPA].
2. Id § 1692(a).

3. Id
4. Id § 1692(b).
5. Id § 1692e.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id § 1692c(b).
Id § 1692d.
Id § 1692e(5).
Id § 1692g(a).
Id.§ 1692g(b).
[669]
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debtor so asks the collector in writing.1 ' The FDCPA establishes a private cause of action for the injured consumer 2 and provides for administrative enforcement primarily by the Federal Trade Commisssion
(FTC),' 3 which can sue in federal district court for civil penalties of up
14
to $10,000 per violation.
While the prohibitions of the FDCPA are broad, they apply only
to the "debt collector," who is defined as
any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or
the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect,
directly or indirectly,
debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or
15
due another.
Creditors who collect their own debts are excluded from this definition 16 on the grounds that they are restrained from engaging in abusive
debt collection practices by their desire to protect and maintain the
goodwill of their customers,17 and that existing FTC remedies and enforcement are sufficient to regulate their practices.' 8
The FDCPA specifically exempts "any attorney-at-law collecting a
debt as an attorney on behalf of and in the name of a client."1 9 The
legislative history of the FDCPA does not clearly indicate why attorneys are exempted or the significance of the qualifying language, 20 and
11. Id § 1692c(c) (a limited class of communications is permissible after such notice).
12. Id § 1692k.
13. Id § 1692. The FTC is not, however, permitted to promulgate any trade regulation
or other rule concerning the collection of debts by debt collectors. Id § 16924d).
14. The FDCPA provides that a violation of its provisions shall be deemed a violation
of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA). Id § 16921(a). Section 5 of the FTCA authorizes the FTC to
commence a civil action to recover a civil penalty in a district court of the United
States against any person, partnership, or corporation which violates any rule
under [the FTCA] respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices. . . with actual
knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances that-."
such act is unfair or deceptive and is prohibited by such rule.
Id § 45(m)(1)(A).
15. Id § 1692a(6).
16. Id. § 1692(6)(A). The FDCPA provides, however, that the term "debt collector"
includes any creditor who in the process of collecting his own debts uses any name other
than his own that would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect the
debt. Id § 1692a(6).
17. See 123 CONG. REC. 10,242 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Annunzio).
18. H.R. RaP. No. 131, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977). For further discussion see infra
note 86 & accompanying text.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F) (1982).
20. The committee reports contain few references to the exemption. Senator Garn opposed a version of the bill that would not have exempted attorneys, arguing that the bill
interfers [sic] with the prerogative of the State courts to regulate the practice of
laws and court procedures. . . . Traditionally, the conduct of attorneys has been
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there is scant case law on the issue.2 1 Because an increasing number of
attorneys are engaging in debt collection as a significant part of their
work,22 it is important to determine whether and to what extent attorneys are subject to FTC regulation of debt collection practices.
The issue of attorney liability under the FDCPA was first addressed by a court in FTC v. Shaffner.23 The FTC issued a resolution
directing the use of compulsory process in an investigation to determine whether various debt collection agencies, creditors, or others had
been engaged in practices that violated the FDCPA or section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).24 In connection with its investigation, the FTC issued a subpoena to an Illinois attorney whose
practice substantially consisted of the collection of debts.25 The respondent attorney alleged that the FTC had no jurisdiction over his
legal practice and that the information required by the subpoena was
within the scope of the attorney-client privilege. 2 6 After the attorney
refused to comply with the subpoena, the FTC sought enforcement in
federal district court.2 7 The court, citing the "far reaching" nature of
the subpoena, 28 denied enforcement in the entirety and "let the Court
regulated by the States. . . . Although I recognize that there are sound arguments
for treating everybody equally, including both attorneys and creditors in any Federal law, this must be weighed against the dangers of eroding further our State and
Federal relationships.
FairDebt Collection PracticesAct: Hearingson S, 656, S. 918, S, 1130 andH. A 5294 Before
the Subcomm. on ConsumerAffairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearingson S.656]. This
comment suggests a rationale for the exemption but sheds little light on the meaning or
scope of the phrase "attorneys acting as attorneys." See also infra note 239.
21. FTC v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1980); Home v. Farrell, 560 F. Supp. 219
(M.D. Pa. 1983) (an attorney who allegedly filed a complaint on behalf of a client and received payments from the debtor was within the exemption granted by the FDCPA); XYZ
Law Firm v. FTC, 525 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (FTC has authority to investigate a
law firm's debt collection activities in order to determine jurisdiction under the FDCPA).
Cf.Heredia v. Freen, 667 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1981) (activities of a landlord and tenant officer
constituted "official" activities exempted from the FDCPA under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(C)).
22. 4 FTC ANN. REP. 2, 10 (1982). See Oversight Hearing On Fair Debt Collection
PracticesAct: Hearingon H.A 4617 Befo~e the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs and Coinage
of the House Comm. on Banking, Financeand UrbanAffairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984)
(remarks of Rep. Annunzio) [hereinafter cited as Hearing on H.t? 4612].
23. 626 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1980).
24. Id at 34.
25. Id
26. Id at 37.
27. Id at 34.
28. Id at 35 n.2. The subpoena asked for detailed information about the firm's policy
for handling and recording consumer complaints, a list of consumers who had complained,
and copies of complaints, responses, and other communications. The subpoena also requested the "complete file (including all material therein)" for specified groups of consumers.
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of Appeals pass on it."29
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the FTC was authorized under the FDCPA to investigate the attorney's practice to determine whether his activities fell within the scope of the FDCPA
exemption - that is, whether he was an "attorney-at-law collecting a
debt as an attorney on behalf of and in the name of a client ' 30 - and
remanded the case to the district court for enforcement of the subpoena
in its entirety. 31 Unfortunately, the court failed to articulate any standards for resolving this kind of preliminary jurisdictional issue. Because this case is one of the few instances in which a court has
considered the exemption,32 and because the court held only that the
FTC may investigate an attorney to determine whether it has jurisdiction, FTC authority under the FDCPA to police the abusive debt collection practices of attorneys remains unclear.
This Article explores the parameters of the FTC's investigatory
and adjudicatory powers over attorney debt collectors. The Article first
examines FTC jurisdiction, possible factors to consider in determining
whether attorney conduct is subject to FTC regulation under the
FDCPA, and the use of section 5 of the FTCA as an alternate basis of
jurisdiction. The second part discusses whether federal involvement in
attorney debt collection activities is appropriate or necessary. The
practical limits on FTC authority are examined, and state standards of
attorney conduct and state enforcement are reviewed. The Article concludes that although the FTC has jurisdiction over attorney debt collectors, neither the FTC nor existing state standards can adequately
protect consumers from the abusive practices of such collectors. The
Article proposes that state bar associations adopt and vigorously enforce the provisions of the FDCPA.
Bases of FTC Jurisdiction Over Lawyer Debt Collectors
Preliminary Subpoena and Investigatory Powers
An attorney who receives a FTC subpoena 33 concerning debt colId.at 34 n. 1 (emphasis in original). The FTC argued that it sought only information from
and about consumer debtors, not clients of the attorney, and that the requested information
would not breach the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 35 n.2.
29. Id
30. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 39.
32. See supra note 21.
33. The FTC currently issues civil investigative demands rather than subpoenas, 15
U.S.C. § 57b-1 (1982), but the two are indistinguishable for purposes of this analysis.
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lection practices might argue that the FTC's investigation of his practice is beyond the scope of the agency's authority, since attorneys are
specifically exempted from coverage under the FDCPA.34 The
Supreme Court, however, has stated that it is the administrative agency
rather than the court that has in the first instance the authority "to determine the question of coverage in the preliminary investigation of
possibly existing violations [and] in doing so to exercise [its] subpoena
power for securing evidence upon that question. 3 5 Courts have consistently held that the jurisdictional issue may not be litigated as a defense in a subpoena enforcement proceeding2 6 An agency subpoena
will be upheld so long as the evidence sought is "not plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose of the [agency] in the discharge
of [its] duties under the [applicable statute]." 3 7T When "the very purpose of the . . investigation is to examine the appellants' course of
business in detail and with particularity. . . to determine whether the
. . .law is applicable to and being violated by appellants' transac38
tions," the subpoena will be upheld.
The significant question is thus whether an FTC investigation of
attorney debt collectors concerns a subject matter that the agency is authorized to investigate. If it does, the courts will generally allow the
agency to determine its jurisdiction over the party based on its initial
evaluation of the facts as evidenced by materials submitted pursuant to
the subpoena.3 9 Nevertheless, a party may challenge the authority of
an agency to issue a subpoena when "(1) the agency has clearly violated a right secured by statute or agency regulation . . .(2) the issue
involved is a strictly legal one not involving the agency's expertise or
any factual determinations. . . or (3) the issue cannot be raised upon
40
judicial review of a later order of the agency."
In one FTC case a party was allowed to claim a statutory exemption as a defense in a subpoena enforcement proceeding. In FTC v.
Miller4 the FTC subpoenaed a common-carrier that the agency conceded was subject to regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act.
34. Id § 1692a(6)(f).
35. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 214 (1946).
36. E.g., id at 214; Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943); FTC v.
Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32, 35-36 (7th Cir. 1980); FTC ,.Feldman, 532 F.2d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir.
1976); FTC v. Gibson, 460 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1972).
37. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943).
38. SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188, 189 (7th Cir. 1975).
39. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 214 (1946).
40. FTC v. Feldman, 532 F.2d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 1976) (citing Borden Inc. v. FTC,
495 F.2d 785, 786-87 (7th Cir. 1974)) (citations omitted).
41. 549 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1977).
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The FTC sought to determine through the subpoena if the company
was using false and misleading advertising. 4 2 Yet under the FTCA
"common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce" are among
those exempt from regulation by the FTC. 43 Moreover, section 6 of the
FTCA, which authorizes the FTC to investigate corporations engaged
in commerce, also exempts such common carriers. 44 The court held
that the FTC lacked the jurisdiction to regulate or to investigate the
company. 4 5 Citing the exceptions to the doctrine that a lack ofjurisdiction is not a basis for challenging an investigative subpoena, the court
noted that the appellant was clearly protected by statute from FTC investigation, that there were no factual issues requiring agency expertise,
and that the right to be free from FTC investigation could not be effec46
tively protected on review of a later order.
A very different situation arises when the FTC investigates an attorney's debt collection practices. In contrast to its treatment of common carriers, the FTCA does not exempt attorneys from either
regulation or investigation by the FTC.4 7 Rather, it is the FDCPA that
provides the exemption, and it merely exempts attorneys from the coverage of the FDCPA. Furthermore, the FDCPA exempts only those
"attorneys-at-law collecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in
the name of a client.' '4 8 Although the Seventh Circuit in FTC v. Shaffner49 did not attempt to ascertain the legislative intent underlying the
FDCPA exemption, it observed that "while the exclusion is not a narrow one, it is readily apparent that Congress did not intend to vest in
every attorney a right to be free from investigation." 50 Thus, neither
act confers upon the attorney the right to be free from an investigation
by the FTC.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under the FDCPA
The Shaffner court further acknowledged that there are attorneys
licensed to practice law who in reality are engaged in other businesses
and therefore should be subject to FTC regulation under the
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id at 454.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1982).
Id § 46(a).
Miller, 549 F.2d at 460.
Id.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(2), 46(a) (1982).
Id. § 1692a(6)(f).

49.
50.

626 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1980). See supra notes 23-32 & accompanying text.
Shaffner, 626 F.2d at 36.
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FDCPA.5 ' Whether an attorney is subject to the FDCPA depends on
whether he is "in fact acting as an attorney practicing law, or in some
other capacity."5 2 Unfortunately, the court provided little guidance as
to the factors that should be considered in determining whether an attorney is "acting as an attorney." The court suggested only that the
manner in which the attorney's advertising characterizes his business
and the functions performed by his employees may be indicia of
53
whether the practice is that of a law firm or a debt collection agency.
54
Absent a clear statement by Congress or the courts, the FTC should
consider several factors when determining this threshold jurisdictional

issue.
Determining Whether an Attorney is Acting as an Attorney For Purposes of
the Exemption

The original sponsor of the FDCPA has indicated that the status of
theperson actually engaged in the collection activity should be a relevant factor in determining whether the attorney exemption applies.
Representative Annunzio stated that the exemption covers only the at-

torney and does not include any of the attorney's employees, including
law clerks.5 5 The FTC has adopted a contrary position, announcing
that non-attorney employees are exempt if they are controlled and supervised by an attorney in the course of rendering legal services.5 6 The
51. Id.
52. Id
53. Id
54. In its annual report to Congress concerning enforcement of the FDCPA, the FTC
recommended that Congress delineate the scope of the "attorney-at-law" exemption. See 4
FTC ANN. REP. 2, 10-11 (1982). Congress is considering removing the exemption completely. See H.R. 4617, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. H 117 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1984);
Hearing on H.A 4617, supra note 22.
55. Representative Annunzio, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, wrote to the President of the American Collectors Association:
In my judgment.. . the attorney exemption extends only to an attorney, does not
include any of his employees and further, extends only to such an attorney if he is
collecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in the name of the attorney's
client. Consequently, my interpretation of the law is that if an attorney attempts to
collect a creditors [sic] debt and does not do so himself, but instead has any individual who is not an attorney, even a law clerk, attempt to locate the consumer or
attempt to collect the alleged debt (by whatever means e.g. phone call or letter)
such conduct would not be exempted from the requirements of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
Letter from Representative Annunzio to John W. Johnson (April 4, 1979) (copy on file with
the HastingsLaw Journal).
56. See the Commission Statement on Fair Debt Collection Practices accompanying
the June 28, 1983, press release announcing the consent decree in U.S. v. Shaffner, No. 83 C
3130 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Commission Statement]. In the Hearing
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FTC position recognizes the common professional practice of delegating tasks to non-lawyers, 57 yet leads to an undesirable result: the
greater the involvement by the attorney in the abusive acts of non-attorneys, the more the participants are insulated from the FDCPA. The
FTC policy statement accompanying the Shaffner consent decree seems
to imply that had there been evidence that the attorney directed the
the FTC would not have had jurisviolative activities of his employees,
58
FDCPA.
the
diction under
Another relevant factor is the nature of the business enterprise. The
courts 59 and the FTC60 presume that Congress did not intend to exempt a debt collection agency merely because it is owned and operated
by an attorney. A business entity that represents itself as a debt collec-

tion agency either by name or by its advertising is not hard to characterize. Yet an entity that represents itself as a law firm but has the

attributes of a debt collection agency can be characterized only by
looking to additional factors. Two such indices might be the percenton HR. 4617, supra note 22, the FTC Associate Director for Credit Practices stated the
agency's position as follows:
Where the services pertinent to collection of an obligation are not provided by the
attorney himself, or by an employee under his supervision and control, the attorney-at-law exemption does not apply. The Commission analysis requires a caseby-case consideration of a number of questions, including:
One, who evaluates the creditor client's files?
Two, who handles the contacts with the alleged debtor to try to encourage voluntary payment?
Three, who handles the contacts with the creditor - (client) - to advise it of the
status of the account?
Four, who has responsibility for negotiating settlements or making other decisions
regarding the disposition of the account?
If these functions are not handled by an attorney, or by a paralegal or other employee under the attorney's direct supervision and control, the exemption does not
apply.
Id at 6-7 (statement of Anne Price Fortney) (emphasis added). It appears that the FTC
agrees, however, that the status of the person is still the critical issue.
57. The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides that it is proper to
delegate work if the work is supervised by the attorney who then has complete professional
responsibility for the work product. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 36 (1980) [hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE]. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct require "reasonable efforts to ensure that the [nonlawyer assistant's] conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 5.3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES].
58. "Non-attorney employees such as paralegal or clinical personnel will also be
treated as falling within this exemption, where the attorneys supervise and control those
non-attorney subordinates as part of the provision of legal services." Commission Statement, supra note 56.
59. Shaffner, 626 F.2d at 36; XYZ Law Firm v. FTC, 525 F. Supp. 1235, 1237-38 (N.D.
Ga. 1981) (citing Shaffner, 626 F.2d at 36).
60. See Commission Statement, supra note 56.
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age of the practice devoted to collection work and the ratio of attorney
to non-attorney employees. Thus, for example, if investigation of a law
firm revealed that 90% of its work involved debt collection or that the
staff consisted of two attorneys and fifteen non-attorneys, many of
whom participated in collection activities, the firm might not be exempt
from the FDCPA no matter how it characterized itself.6 1 Yet such an
approach raises difficult questions as to where lines ought to be drawn,
and may have the effect of penalizing a legitimate law firm that desires
to specialize in collection cases or reduce costs and promote efficiency

by hiring non-attorneys and providing ample clerical support. Of
course, it might be argued that this approach is appropriate because
firms specializing in debt collection work, including law firms, are the
natural objects of FDCPA regulation.
The activity engaged in, that is, the nature of the tasks the attorney
or non-attorney employee performs, may provide a further basis for
determining whether the exemption applies. The FTC staff takes the
position that when an attorney composes and signs standard collection
letters using his own letterhead, and provides those letters to creditors
for a flat fee, the attorney is not exempt from the provisions of the
FDCPA. 62 The rationale for this position is that under these circum61. In March of 1981, the California Bureau of Collection and Investigative Services
published a Notice of Proposed Regulations Concerning Attorneys-at-Law and Collection
Agencies. One of the purposes of the regulation was to define those circumstances in which
an attorney would be deemed to be "conducting a collection agency" under CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 6854(a) (West 1975) and thus no longer entitled to the attorney exemption
under that statute. The proposed regulation provided in part that
(a).. . a person shall be deemed to be conducting a collection agency if such person employs one or more individuals whose primary function is the collection of
claims owed to others.
(b) For the purpose of subsection (a):
(1) "Primary" means more than 50% of the working hours of the employee;
(2) "Collection of claims" means determining or attempting to determine the location of persons owing claims to others, or making oral or written demands for
payment upon consumers owing claims to others.
The State Bar of California argued that if the proposal were enacted, it "would place a
substantial number of California attorneys and their law firms, none of whom operate collection agencies, subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Collection and Investigative
Services." Letter from the State Bar of California (Truitt A. Richey, Jr., Chief Assistant
General Counsel) to Bureau of Collection and Investigative Services (James T. Cathcart,
Chief) (May 28, 1981) (Comments on Behalf of the State Bar of California in Opposition to
Proposed Regulation 605, Title 16, California Administrative Code) (copy on file with the
HastingsLaw Journal). The State Bar suggested that the appropriate distinction between a
collection agency and a law firm is that the collection agency can take assignments of debts
in order to bring suit in its own name, whereas the attorney is precluded from doing so,
bringing suit only on behalf of the client and in the client's name. Id at 3-4.
62. II Staff Interpretives, Letter to Foley & Lardner, Sept. 21, 1978.
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stances there is little difference between the services rendered by the
63
attorney and those rendered by other flat-rate debt collectors. It is
unclear how this rationale would apply to an attorney on a general

retainer who does nothing more than mail out dunning letters to cus64
tomers delinquent in their payments to the lawyer's client.
In contrast, the attorney who is engaged by a creditor to file a lawsuit to collect the debt would appear to be "an attorney collecting a
debt on behalf of and in the name of a client." Most attorneys, how65
ever, will attempt to settle a case before filing suit or going to trial.
Settlement can only be achieved by communicating with the debtor by
letter or telephone, activities that are the hallmark of debt collectors.
Of course, only the lawyer has the authority to file a lawsuit if the ex-

tra-judicial measures fail.66 Any standard seeking to distinguish the
attorney from the debt collector on the basis of the percentage of accounts in which lawsuits are filed might penalize those attorneys who
67
are successful negotiators.
63. Id
64. In a 1976 informal opinion, the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association discussed a proposal in which a lawyer, representing a
large retail organization, would prepare a series of form collection letters. Using information
furnished by the client, the lawyer's staff would type the letters on his personal stationery
with automatic typewriters and mail the letters to debtors. The language of the letters would
become progressively firmer, and they would instruct the debtor not to contact the attorney's
office because records of the account were not maintained there and the account had "not
been turned over for collection." The Committee found:
Although the proposed demand letter project is not per se unethical, violations of
the Code of Professional Responsibility could frequently and easily occur unless
the lawyer personally exercises the care and independent judgment required to see
that each letter sent is accurate and appropriate as to the account of the debtor
when it is sent. DR 6-101(A)(2). In the absence of the exercise of that care, judgment and responsibility we see no substantial difference from the practice condemned in Formal Opinions Nos. 68 and 253 [in which the lawyer furnished
letterhead stationery on which the client wrote to debtors].
A lawyer cannot ethically lend his name to collection efforts for a client without accepting full professional responsibility.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1368 (1976).
65. "[T]he vast majority of accounts referred to attorneys never result in suits being
brought. In the largest debt collection law firm, only about 10 percent of all accounts resulted in a lawsuit." Hearingon H.R. 4617,supra note 22, at 2 (remarks of Rep. Annunzio).
66. The attorney need not file suit in order to be engaged in the practice of law. The
ABA takes the position that "the attorney in the collecting of claims with or without suit is
engaged in the practice of law." ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 294 (1958). The ABA has also indicated that "[t]he fact that a layman can lawfully
render a certain service does not necessarily mean that it would not be professional service
when rendered by a lawyer." ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal
Op. 57 (1932).
67. Conversely, such an approach might have led to a different result in the Shaffner
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The FTC might also consider the manner in which the attorney
pursues debt collection activities. For example, if the attorney makes
otherwise legitimate phone calls to debtors urging settlement of a possible law suit in a harrassing manner--calling continually or at inconvenient hours, or using abusive language-the attorney might be deemed
"stripped" of his exemption from the FDCPA on the ground that it is
inappropriate for members of the legal profession to engage in such
conduct. Of course, such an approach would render the exemption
meaningless and is thus not likely to find much favor with the courts.
The contractualrelationship between the creditor and the attorney
is another possible basis for distinguishing the attorney from the debt
collector. The attorney is presumably acting in his capacity as an attorney if his agreement with the creditor includes the authority to institute
legal proceedings on the creditor's behalf.68 Such a simplistic standard
would elevate form over substance, since an attorney could avoid liability merely by including such a provision in the contract whether or
not litigation was contemplated. Alternatively, one could inquire into
the percentage of accounts in which lawsuits were filed, but this would
again create a disincentive to settle or to proceed informally.
One final possibility is to consider the method of compensation.
Debt collection firms generally receive a percentage of the amount collected, 69 whereas attorneys typically are on a retainer or charge on an
hourly basis for work performed. Nevertheless, a lawyer who is compensated by receiving a percentage of the amount collected may argue
that he is working on a contingency fee basis, an acceptable method of
payment in the legal profession.
None of these possible factors alone can provide an adequate standard for determining whether attorney conduct is within the scope of
the FDCPA exemption. No doubt the FTC and the courts will weigh
these factors in light of the facts of each case. 70 In the meantime it
appears that consumers cannot expect certain protection from abusive
case, since a search of court records in Cook County, Illinois reveals a large number of
collection suits filed by Milton Shaffner on behalf of clients.
68. In some instances, however, attorneys are expressly prohibited by their contract
with the creditor from filing suit on the creditor's behalf. Hearing on H.. 4617,supra note
22, at 2 (remarks of Rep. Annunzio).
69. American Collectors Association, A Plan For Excellence 1984-89 at 17 (June 1984)
(a five year chart of action for the American Collectors Association).
70. Indeed, a court considering the first three factors - the status of the person, the
nature of the enterprise, and the kind of activity engaged in - could plausibly find a given
firm to be both a law firm and a collection agency. For example, a law firm may use several
non-attorneys to perform traditional debt collection activities. When such efforts prove unsuccessful, the matter may be turned over to the attorneys in the firm to bring suit. A court
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debt collection practices by attorneys under the FDCPA, and that alternate bases of FTC jurisdiction over attorneys should be considered.
Jurisdiction Under Section 5 of the FTCA
Even if the FTC determines that an attorney is exempt from the
provisions of the FDCPA, the agency may nevertheless attempt to proceed under its general FTCA section 5 authority. 7 ' Section 5 authorizes the FTC to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations from
using unfair methods of competition or unfair and deceptive acts or
practices "in or affecting commerce."' 72 The FTCA does not define the
terms "unfair or deceptive" or specify prohibited practices. 73 Congress
left it to the FTC to give meaning to those terms through adjudication
of individual cases. 74 In a typical section 5 action, the FTC must find
that those actions constitute unthat the alleged actions occurred and
75
fair and deceptive acts or practices.
could find that the first stage of the operation is subject to the FDCPA while the second
stage is not.
71. The FTC investigatory resolution giving rise to the Shaffner case stated that one of
its purposes was "to determine whether creditors and other organizations which collect debts
are engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices... in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act .. " See Federal Trade Commission Resolution Directing
Use Of Compulsory Process In Non-Public Investigation (copy on file with the Hastings
Law Journal).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1982).
73. The absence of statutory definitions of proscribed conduct was intentional, as indicated by the legislative history:
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is no
limit to human inventiveness in this field. Even if all known unfair practices were
specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin over
again. If Congress were to adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an
endless task.
H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914).
It is noteworthy that one of the factors used by the FTC in determining whether a
practice is unfair is "whether the practice . . . offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law or otherwise. . . ." FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,
405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972) (quoting Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation
Rule 408, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the
Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964)). Thus, it may be possible for
the FTC to bring an action under the FTCA against an attorney exempt from the FDCPA
for activities that offend public policy as enunciated in the FDCPA.
74. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1982).
75. Id In contrast, in an action brought under the FDCPA the FTC need only prove
that the proscribed actions occurred. Id § 16921(a) (violation of FDCPA deemed to be a
violation of FTCA; FTC need not show acts were unfair or deceptive). FDCPA and FTCA
actions are different both in terms of the FTC's burdens and the procedures used. A section
5 action is an administrative proceeding before an administrative law judge, with review by
the FTC and ultimately the court of appeals. See id § 45(b)-(d). The remedy for a violation
is a cease and desist order. Id§ 45(b). An action for administrative enforcement under the
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Before the FDCPA was enacted, the FTC brought numerous ac76
tions under section 5 to prohibit abusive debt collection practices.
The question thus arises whether the FDCPA in any way precludes the

FTC from continuing to use its section 5 authority in this area, and
specifically with regard to the debt collection activities of attorneys.
It is apparent that the FDCPA is not the FTC's sole enforcement

mechanism for combatting abusive debt collection practices. Courts
have noted that "unless Congress specifically withdraws authority in
particular areas, the [FTC] under its general grant of authority under

[section 5] can restrain unfair business practices in interstate commerce
even if the activities or industries have been the subject of [other] legislation." 77 Congress has made no such specific withdrawal of authority
78
in the area of debt collection practices.
It has nevertheless been argued that Congress, by specifically exempting attorneys from the FDCPA, manifested an intent to completely remove attorney collection practices from the scrutiny of the
federal government. 79 Although the FTCA does not expressly exempt
such practices from its purview, the FDCPA's explicit exemption of
attorneys might be construed to implicitly amend 80 the FTCA to inFDCPA can be brought in federal district court by the FTC, and the defendant is subject to
civil penalties because the FDCPA authorizes the FTC to enforce the FDCPA in the same
manner as it would a FTC trade regulation rule. See id §§ 16921(a), 45(m)(1)(A).
76. See, e.g., Spiegel, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 425 (1975), modpfed,540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976)
(bringing collection actions in inconvenient forums); Parents' Magazine Enters., 68 F.T.C.
980 (1965) (creditor falsely representing that the debtor's credit rating would be adversely
affected or that his name would be given to a credit reporting agency); Wilson Chemical
Co., 64 F.T.C. 168 (1964) (creditor and attorney threatening to institute legal proceedings
with no such intent); William H. Wise Co., 53 F.T.C. 408 (1956) (creditor misrepresenting
identity when collecting a debt), af'd,246 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 856
(1957). From 1914 to 1938, section 5 of the FTCA prohibited "unfair methods of competition," forcing the FTC to prove that a competitor of the offender had been injured. FTC v.
Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 654 (1931). In 1938, Congress passed the Wheeler-Lea Act, ch.
49, 52 Stat. 111 (1983) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 44, 45, 52-58 (1982)), prohibiting unfair
or deceptive acts and practices as well as unfair methods of competition.
77. Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 1976) (quoting Peerless Products v.
FTC, 284 F.2d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,365 U.S. 844 (1961) (activities specifically permitted under municipal legislative scheme)). See FTC v. Sperry Hutchinson, 405
U.S. 233 (1972) (activities not otherwise unlawful); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316
(1965) (activities not otherwise unlawful); FTC v. Cement Institute, 338 U.S. 683 (1947)
(activities punishable under another statute).
78. The FDCPA does prohibit the FTC from promulgating any trade regulation rules
or other regulations with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692/(d) (1982). The FDCPA places no other express restriction on the authority of the
FTC to act under the FTCA.
79. See Memorandum of Milton Shaffner In Support of Motion to Quash Subpeona
Duces Tecum at 7, FTC v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1980).
80. One can say either that the FTCA is amended by implication to include the exemp-
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elude a similar exemption.
It is a well settled principle of statutory construction that an
amendment of a prior act ordinarily must be express to be effective; 8'
amendments by implication are not favored and will not be upheld in

doubtful cases. 82 Nothing in the FDCPA or its legislative history indicates that Congress intended that Act to modify FTC authority by cre-

ating an implied exemption in the FTCA. In fact, the House
Committee Report on the FDCPA includes a statement that "[n]othing
in this section [dealing with administrative enforcement by the FTC of
the FDCPA83] is intended to restrict any authority granted to the Com84
mission under existing law."
Further, it is well established that "[w]here Congress has enacted

legislation on a particular subject, subsequent legislation will not be
construed to modify, repeal or supplant the legislation, particularly
where both statutes serve distinct purposes. Rather courts will reconcile the earlier statute and the later legislation if possible. ' 85 The
FDCPA was narrowly designed to address a particular problem abusive practices by debt collection agencies. 86 In contrast, the FTCA
tion or that FTCA authority over attorney collection practices is repealed by implication. IA
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 22.13, 23.09 (4th ed. 1972).
81. See, e.g., Freeman v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 505 F.2d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 1974).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 103 n.12 (1964); Freeman v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 505 F.2d at 533; United States v. Silverman, 132 F. Supp. 820, 82830 (D. Conn. 1955).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 16921(1982).
84. H.R. REP. No. 131, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1977). The legislative history indicates
that the FDCPA was enacted to fill the gaps left by the FTCA and strengthen enforcement
against independent debt collection agencies. See infra note 86 & accompanying text.
85. Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted).
Reference to a subsequent statute to interpret a prior act so as to restrict its applicability is
only proper when the statutes are inpar materia and there is an irreconcilable conflict. See
generally 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.03 (4th ed. 1973).
86. The legislative history of the FDCPA indicates that Congress believed that FTCA
section 5 cease and desist orders were not an effective means of controlling abuses by the
relatively small and unstable debt collection agencies. See H.R. REP. No. 131, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7 (1977); see also The Debt Collection PracticesAct: Hearingson H.R. 11969 Before
the Subcomm. on ConsumerAffairs of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 296-98 (testimony of Lewis Goldfarb, Deputy Assistant Director, Division of Special Statutes, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (elusive nature of debt collectors as compared to the larger creditors and resulting ineffectiveness of FTCA regulation)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on HR. 11969]. Most complaints were against these independent collection agencies, seeS. REp. No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprintedin 1977
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1695, 1696, and the FDCPA was designed to facilitate FTC
enforcement against them by declaring specific practices to be unlawful and providing for
the imposition of civil penalties. Additionally, Congress established private rights of action
that it anticipated would constitute a far greater deterrent to debt collection agencies. See
Hearingson H.R. 11969, supra,at 296-97. Creditors were exempted from the FDCPA be-
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was broadly designed to reach any unfair practices in or affecting commerce. These objectives are quite distinct, and restricting the scope of
the FTCA to that of the FDCPA would impermissibly defeat the legislative objectives underlying each statute.
In sum, the scope of the FTC's jurisdiction under the FTCA must
be resolved without reference to its jurisdiction under the FDCPA. If
the FTC had the authority to proceed against an attorney under FTCA
section 5 before the adoption of the FDCPA, that authority remains
intact.
Does the FTC Have Jurisdiction Over Attorneys?
The FTCA provides a broad grant of authority to the FTC, and
neither explicitly nor implicitly exempts attorneys from this authority.
Nevertheless, the federal courts have not directly addressed whether
the FTC has general section 5 authority over the practices of attorneys,
although the Supreme Court has upheld the application of section 5 of
the FTCA to the medical profession.8 7 The uncertainty in part revolves
around whether the practice of law is a practice "in or affecting
commerce." 88
The Practiceof Law as Commerce
The Supreme Court has recognized that some activities of lawyers
are commercial in nature. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,89 petitioners brought a class action alleging that the respondents' enforcement of
a minimum fee schedule for legal services constituted price fixing in
violation of the Sherman Act. 90 Respondents contended that as a
"learned profession," the practice of law was not "trade" or "commerce" under the Act.9 1 The Supreme Court held that the practices in
question were subject to, 92 and violated, the Sherman Act, and noted
cause section 5 proceedings were deemed sufficient to police their abuses. See id Just as the
exemption of creditors from FDCPA coverage does not preclude the FTC from proceeding
against them under section 5 for collection abuses, see, e.g., In re Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 48
Fed. Reg. 31,867 (1983) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 13) (proposed July 12, 1983); In re
Aldens, Inc., 98 F.T.C. 790 (1981); In re Hiken Furniture Co., 91 F.T.C. 1115 (1978), the
FDCPA should not be read to limit the FTC's section 5 authority over collection practices
by attorneys.
87. American Medical Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), afdmem., 455 U.S.
676 (1982) (per curiam) (by an equally divided court).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1982).
89. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
90. Id. at 778.
91. Id at 779.
92. The Court held that because the "transactions which create the need for the partic-
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that "[i]n the modem world it cannot be denied that the activities of

lawyers play an important part in commercial intercourse." 93 Two
years later, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,9 4 the Court held that the

advertising of legal services was a constitutionally protected form of
commercial speech and noted that "the belief that lawyers are somehow 'above' trade has become an anachronism. 9 5
The FTC takes the position that attorneys are covered by section 5
of the FTCA.96 In In re Wilson Chemical Co.97 a Pennsylvania attor-

ney was charged in an FTC proceeding with supplying a company with
collection letters on his letterhead that threatened resort to legal action
when such action was not contemplated. 98 The attorney contended
that section 5 of the FTCA did not apply to him because the collection
letter of an attorney is not "commerce" within the meaning of the
FTCA. 99 The FTC, however, concluded that his preparation of the letter, his knowledge of the way it would be used, and his receipt of compensation for his services made him "equally as liable as the company
for any violation of section 5 which arises from the letters."'' ° Thus
the attorney had violated section 5 and was individually subject to a
cease and desist order.10 1
ular legal services in question frequently are interstate transactions," the practice of law may
constitute "trade or commerce" subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act. Id at 783-84. Although the language of the FTCA differs from that of the Sherman Act, lower federal courts
have construed the FTCA as jurisdictionally in pari materia with the Sherman Act. See
American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 770 (6th Cir. 1966). In fact, the FTC's "in
or affecting commerce" requirement may be less rigid than the Sherman Act's requirement
of "trade or commerce among the several states" since the activity need only affect commerce.
The Goldfarb Court did recognize that "there may be legal services that have no nexus
with interstate commerce and thus are beyond the reach of the Sherman Act," 421 U.S. at
785-86, but it seems clear that debt collection activities, which usually arise out of commercial transactions, are the kind of legal services that have such a nexus. Even in Shafner,
where the attorney's business was conducted entirely within Cook County, the court noted
that the attorney "uses an instrumentality of interstate commerce, the telephone, and that it
is not necessary that [he] be engaged in interstate commerce. Even businesses purely intrastate in character can be subject to federal regulation if they directly affect interstate commerce." Shaffner, 626 F.2d at 37.
93. Goldfarb,421 U.S. at 788.
94. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
95. Id at 371-72.
96. Hearingon H.R. 4617, supra note 22, at 7, 21 (statement of Anne Price Fortney of
the FTC).
97. 64 F.T.C. 168 (1964).
98. Id at 182.
99. Id at 186.
100. Id at 187.
101. Id at 190-91. The FTC has also entered into consent orders involving attorney
debt collection activities. See New Process Co., 87 F.T.C. 1359 (1976); Pay 'N Save Corp.,
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Several state courts have considered whether attorneys are engaged in trade or commerce for purposes of state consumer protection
statutes. 10 2 In Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo &
Trantolo'0 3 the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld an investigative demand by the state pursuant to the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act (CUPTA)104 on a law firm suspected of engaging in deceptive trade
practices. 10 5 The court noted the intent of the legislature that courts
construing CUPTA be "guided by interpretations given by the Federal
Trade Commission and the federal courts to Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act."' 0 6 The court concluded that the federal
courts would construe the FTCA to apply to attorneys, 0 7 and held that
CUPTA's regulation of "any 'trade or commerce' does not totally exclude all conduct of the profession of law," and does not bar an investigatory demand. 0 8 Similarly, a Louisiana appeals court held in Reed v.
Allison & Perrone'0 9 that the advertising of legal services is clearly
"trade or commerce""10 and is therefore subject to the provisions of the
Lousiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.I' In
addition, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, reviewing an action'12
brought under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act' 13 against an
attorney for failure to timely obtain a name change for his client, held
that it was reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended legal
86 F.T.C 688 (1975); Commercial Serv. Co., 86 F.T.C 467 (1975); Compact Electra Corp., 83
F.T.C 547 (1973).
102. The state acts are often modeled after the FTC acts and are known as "Little FTC
Acts." Indeed, many state statutes expressly provide that interpretation and application of
the state law should be based on the interpretation and application of the federal law. See,
e.g., Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.50.545 (1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-11 Ob(b) (West Supp. 1984); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 121/, § 262 (1981).
103. 190 Conn. 510, 461 A.2d 938 (1983).
104. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-1l0a to -ll0q (West Supp. 1984).
105. Heslin, 190 Conn. at 511, 461 A.2d at 939.
106. Id at 518, 461 A.2d at 942 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-1 10b(b)).
107. Heslin, 190 Conn. at 519,461 A.2d at 942. The court came to this conclusion based
on the Supreme Court's application of the FTCA to medical doctors, American Medical
Ass'n v. FTC, 455 U.S. 676 (1982), affg mem., 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), and on its
application of the Sherman Antitrust Act to lawyers, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975).
108. Heslin, 190 Conn. at 521, 461 A.2d at 943.
109. 376 So. 2d 1067 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
110. Id at 1068. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1402(9) (West Supp. 1984).
I11. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1401-:1418 (West Supp. 1984).
112. DeBakey v. Staggs, 605 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), afd, 612 S.W.2d 924
(Tex. 1981).
113. TEX. Bus. & Com. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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1 14
services to be covered by the state act.
In contrast, an Illinois court held that the conduct of attorneys is
not subject to the state consumer protection law. 1 5 The plaintiffs had
sued their attorney under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act1 16 for misrepresentation and failure to disclose
material facts in conjunction with a real estate transaction for which
the attorney had been retained. 11 7 The court noted Goldfarb, Bates,
and Reed' 18 and explained that those cases "dealt only with commercial
aspects of the legal profession through activities which would have a
direct effect on the consuming public and not with the practice of law
itself."1 1 9 That is, Goldfarb, Bates, and Reeddealt with the "business"
aspects of the practice of law (e.g. the setting of fees and advertising
services and costs) and not with the manner in which the attorney conducted himself in providing the legal services. The Illinois court noted
that the United States Supreme Court in Goldfarb stated that "[i]t
would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business activities"' 120 and concluded that the legislature's use of "trade or commerce" in defining the application2 of the
state act was not meant to include the actualpractice of law.' '
Even if one accepts the distinction made by the Illinois court, it
would not be "unrealistic" to view the debt collection activities of lawyers (other than the filing and prosecution of lawsuits) as "interchangeable with other business activities."'122 Debt collection is an enterprise
that is regularly engaged in by non-attorneys in a totally commercial
setting, as well as by attorneys in the context of client representation.
Attorneys who collect debts as part of their practice engage in essentially the same collection activities as debt collectors who are not attorneys. These activities may include locating the debtors (skiptracing),

114. DeBakey v. Staggs, 605 S.W.2d at 633.
App. 3d 580, 447 N.E.2d 1007 (1983).
115. Frahn v. Urkovich, 113 Ill.
116. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , §§ 261-272 (1981).
117. Frahm, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 581, 447 N.E.2d at 1008.
118. Id at 583-85, 447 N.E.2d at 1010-11. The Heslin case had not yet been decided.
119. Id.at 584, 447 N.E.2d at 1010 (emphasis added). The court distinguished thepractice of law in DeBakey, 605 S.W.2d 631, because physicians and health care providers were
specifically exempted from the Texas act where the litigation was based on a claim of negligence. An amendment which would have exempted all professional services was tabled by
the Texas legislature. Frahm, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 584-85, 447 N.E,2d at 1010.
120. Frahm, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 584, 447 N.E.2d at 1010 (citing Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773,
788 n.17).
121. Id at 585, 447 N.E.2d at 1011.
122. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17. The Goldfarb Court noted in its discussion of the
attorney's activities that "the examination of a land title is a service; the exchange of such a
service for money is 'commerce' in the most common usage of that word." Id at 787-88.
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sending dunning letters, making telephone contact, establishing payment plans, and sometimes even accepting payment of debts. 23 Each
of these activities is a common business practice that does not require
the specialized skill or expertise of the attorney. Thus, even if the attorney collecting a debt is considered to be "acting as an attorney on behalf of and in the name of a client," and is thus exempt from the
provisions of the FDCPA, he or she nevertheless may be engaged in
"commerce" for purposes of section 5 of the FTCA.
It is also noteworthy that the FTC considers debt collecting to be a
"business practice" rather than a "scope of practice" issue with regard
to professionals.1 24 The FTC reasons that since "virtually the same
business practices are engaged in both by professional and non-professional business establishments, there is no valid reason for arbitrarily
immunizing the anticompetitive and/or deceptive practices of the for25
mer group from FTC scrutiny and prosecution."'
Moreover, strong public policy reasons support regulating abusive
debt collection practices of attorneys under the FTCA. Unlike other
aspects of the attorney's practice that may have an adverse effect on the
client alone, 26 abusive debt collection practices may have a profound
adverse "effect on the consuming public."' 27 Absent a private cause of
action under the FDCPA, the remedies available to harrassed debtors
are often inadequate. 28 Thus, debt collection activities are a facet of
attorney practice that the FTC may regulate under its mandate to prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the "public interest." 29
In summary, regardless of the coverage of the FDCPA, it appears
that attorney debt collectors fall within the scope of the language of
FTCA section 5. Perhaps the best evidence for this conclusion is that
efforts to specifically exempt lawyers have failed. The 97th Congress
rejected an amendment to the FTCA that would have exempted from
its coverage practitioners of a profession whose members are licensed
123. See Hearingon H.R. 4617, supra note 22, at 36 (written statement of the American
Collectors Ass'n).
124. S. REP. No. 451, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1982) (letter of the FTC to Hon. Bob
Packwood, Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate,
May 27, 1982). Other "business practices" are advertising, contracting for goods and services, and determining fee schedules, office locations, and hiring practices. Id
125. Id
126. Conflicts arising over the sufficiency of legal representation, for example, may have
an impact only on parties to the contract. Such persons have adequate private remedies in
the form of contract actions or malpractice suits.
127. See supra note 119 & accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 172-79 & accompanying text.
129. See FTCA § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1982).
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and regulated by a state. 130 Thus it appears that FTC regulation in this
area can be avoided only if Congress lacks the power to legislate FTC

jurisdiction over attorneys.
Is FTC Regulation of Attorneys Prohibited by the
13
Constitution? 1
Lawyers have argued1 3 2 that federal regulation of attorney conduct through the FTC violates constitutional principles of federalism as
expressed in the tenth amendment. 133 Because the Constitution does
not expressly delegate the regulation of the practice of law to the federal government, or prohibit such regulation by the states, attorneys
have argued that FTC jurisdiction over attorneys would constitute an
impermissible infringement on state authority.1 34 Yet even assuming
arguendo that the tenth amendment bars FTC interference with the legalprofessionthrough regulation of state bar associations, it is apparent
that it poses no bar when the challenged conduct is that of an individ-

ual attorney.
130. S. REP. No. 451, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1982). The bill was S. 2499, The Federal
Trade Commission Amendments Act of 1982. The amendment in the form cited in the text
was rejected by the Senate Appropriations Committee by a vote of 15-14 on December 15,
1982. 43 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1095, at 1121-23 (Dec. 23, 1982). The
Committee approved a compromise amendment that would have been less restrictive in
limiting FTC activities concerning state regulated professions. This amendment passed the
Senate but died in the Conference Committee. Id at 1122. The session ended without an
FTC authorization bill, and the FTC continued to operate on a continuing resolution. Id at
1123. An amendment to the FTC authorization bill (H.R. 2970) was introduced in the
House on June 14, 1983, and would exempt from FTC scrutiny "'professionals' whose practices are 'effectively regulated by the state court of last resort in civil cases or by such court
and by state law."' 44 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1120, at 1204 (June 23,
1983).
131. This Article does not examine whether activities of the state bar associations are
exempt from the Sherman Act, see Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1942); see also
Bates, 433 U.S. at 356-57; Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791, because no action against state bar
associations can be contemplated unless they authorize or encourage the debt collection
abuses of individual attorneys. Because state bar associations do not encourage such activity
by attorneys, the question addressed here is whether the state has the exclusive right to
regulate the practice of law and professional standards of conduct.
132. See the arguments raised in FTC Activities Concerning Professionals.- Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Consumers ofthe Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981), by the States of Texas at 50-51; Iowa at 65-66;
Wisconsin at 69-70; Missouri at 189-90; and Alabama at 197-98. See also XYZ Law Firm v.
FTC, 525 F. Supp. 1235, 1237-38 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
133. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or
to the people." U.S. CONST. amend X.
134. See supra note 132.
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Congress has the authority to impose restraints on unlawful individual activities despite the existence of state regulations governing the

general conduct of a group. Clearly, attorneys are not exempt from
criminal statutes despite the standards of conduct developed by the bar
and attendant disciplinary enforcement mechanisms at the bar's disposal. 135 Moreover, federal law is replete with provisions that govern the
conduct of attorneys in their practice of law. For example, federal
courts have consistently held that attorneys may be named as defendants in actions brought under the federal securities laws. 136 In fact,
some courts have noted that federal regulation of attorney conduct

through the securities laws is important because of the attorney's professional status and public reliance on attorney expertise.1 37 Thus, despite the fact that attorneys are not expressly identified in the securities
laws, courts have upheld the power of Congress to reach their conduct,
and the authority of the SEC to assert jurisdiction over them. 13 8 This is
so even though various state codes of professional responsibility may
cover the same misconduct and provide for the imposition of sanctions. 139 Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that Congress does not
necessarily exceed the limits of the tenth amendment merely because of
"the concurrent effects of its legislation upon a matter otherwise within
135. An attorney is of course subject to criminal sanctions for such acts as murder, robbery, or kidnapping, in addition to likely disbarment for illegal conduct involving moral
turpitude. See MODEL CODE, supra note 57, at DR 1-102(A)(3). The lawyer does not escape
criminal liability merely because the illegal act was in the course of the practice of law. See,
e.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964)
(affirming conviction of an attorney for conspiracy, securities fraud, and mail fraud).
136. See, e.g., SEC v. Universal Major Indus., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976) (attorney
held liable since opinion letters were on his stationery and could have been perceived as
expression of his opinion), cert. denied,434 U.S. 834 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d
687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,430 U.S. 955 (1977) (attorney may be liable for misrepresentations regarding a securities transaction); Sohns v. Dahli, 392 F. Supp. 1208, 1213 n.8
(W.D. Va. 1975) ("A license to practice law would iot clothe an individual with armor
against his direct misrepresentations to a purchaser or seller.").
137. See, e.g., SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1028 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
950 (1979); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973); Felts v. National
Account Sys. Ass'n, 469 F. Supp. 54, 68 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
138. Under the securities laws, attorneys may be subject to private actions seeking damages, see, e.g., Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1358-62 (5th Cir. 1981), to SEC actions imposing disciplinary sanctions, see SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1983), and to
civil remedies including injunctions against any further violation of the securities laws, see,
e.g., SEC v. Universal Major Indus., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd.,
489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
139. Compare § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1983)
and SEC General Rules and Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1983) with MODEL CODE,
supra note 57, at DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR 7-102(A)(3), (5), (7).
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the control of the State."'
Although the mere fact of state regulation does not preclude

FTCA jurisdiction, opponents of federal regulation of attorneys also
rely heavily on National League of Cities v. Usery.14 1 In Usery the
Supreme Court held that the tenth amendment "expressly declares the
constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion
that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively
in the federal system."' 42 The tenth amendment thus imposes a limitation on the exercise of federal power under the commerce clause so as
to prohibit the federal government from forcing upon the states "its
choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral
governmental functions are to be made."' 43 Under Usery it appears
that federal regulation of attorneys could be barred by the tenth
amendment if the regulation 1) regulates the "States as States," 2) "ad-

dresses matters that are indisputably attribute[s] of State sovereignty,"
and 3) directly impairs the State's ability "to structure integral opera-

tions in areas of traditional governmental functions."'

44

The regulation of the practice of law traditionally has been the
province of the state, with final authority usually vested in the supreme
court of that state.1 4 5 Federal courts have consistently recognized and
upheld this state interest.1 46 In Goldfarb the Supreme Court recognized
that
the States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions
within their boundaries, and that as part of their power to protect the
public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power
140. Sperry v. Florida ex rel Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 403 (1962). The Court further
stated that "[t]he authority of Congress is no less when the state power which it displaces
would otherwise have been exercised by the state judiciary rather than by the state legislature." Id
141. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
142. Id at 843 (citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
143. Id at 855.
144. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88
(1981).
145. See, e.g., In re Stephenson, 511 P.2d 136, 140 (Alaska 1973); Unauthorized Practice
of Law Comm. v. Grimes, 654 P.2d 822, 823 (Colo. 1982); Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn.
416, 422-24, 210 N.W.2d 275, 280-81 (1973); Taylor v. Hoboken Bd. of Educ., 187 N.J.
Super. 546, 553, 455 A.2d 552, 556 (1983); State v. Cook, 84 Wash. 2d 342, 343, 525 P.2d 761,
763 (1974); Mendicino v. Whitchurch, 565 P.2d 460, 475 (Wyo. 1977).
146. See, e.g., In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130
(1872); Saier v. State Bar of Michigan, 293 F.2d 756 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 368 U.S. 947
(1961); Silverman v. Browning, 414 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn.), affid, 429 U.S. 876 (1976). See
also Ables v. Jones, 587 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1978) (state licensing fees for attorneys upheld
against constitutional challenges); In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882 (9th Cir.), cert.denied,421
U.S. 978 (1975) (right of state court to inquire into attorney-client fee arrangements upheld).
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to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the
practice of professions. . . The interest of the States in regulating
lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary
governmental function of administering
justice, and have historically
14 7
been "officers of the courts."'
In Bates the Court reiterated that "the regulation of the activities of the
bar is at the core of the State's power to protect the public."' 14 8 Certainly, the states themselves believe it is their function to regulate attorneys 149 and no doubt view this responsibility as an "integral
governmental function."
Yet it is difficult to imagine how regulation of an individual attorney's allegedly unfair or deceptive acts could be a regulation of the
"States as States" in "matters that are indisputably attributes of state
sovereignty."'' 50 In Usery the state was directly affected as an employer
whose sovereign power would be subject to federal wage and hours
provisions.' 5 1 In contrast, the FTCA imposes no requirements, duties,
or limitations on the states. Each state retains sovereignty over its legal
profession despite concurrent federal regulation of some individual
conduct of attorneys.
It is even more difficult to conceive how FTC jurisdiction over individual attorneys would impair the ability of the states to "structure
152
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions."'
The state remains free to license attorneys by establishing standards for
admission to practice and to prescribe rules for the practice of law
within the state. For example, in Sperry v. Floridaex re. FloridaBar 5 3
the Supreme Court considered whether a non-lawyer performing certain acts relating to the preparation and prosecution of a patent action
in Florida could be enjoined from doing so by the state bar. The bar
contended that under Florida law such acts constituted the unauthorized practice of law. Recognizing Florida's substantial interest in regulating the practice of law within the state,1 54 the Court nevertheless
held that the Commissioner of Patents, pursuant to its powers under
federal law, had expressly granted non-lawyers authority to perform
such acts.155 The Court noted that given the limited impact of this fed147.
148.

Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 792.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 361.

149. See supra note 132.
150. See supra note 144 & accompanying text.
151. Usery, 426 U.S. at 845.
152. See supra note 144 & accompanying text.
153.
154.

373 U.S. 379 (1963).
Id at 383.

155.

Id at 384 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 31 (1982)).
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eral regulation, "the State maintains control over the practice of law
within its borders except to the limited extent necessary for the accom' 156
plishment of the federal objectives."
Even if it could be established that FTC jurisdiction over individual attorneys would be prohibited under the three-pronged Usery test,
the tenth amendment still should not operate as a bar. As the Supreme
Court noted in Hodel v. VirginiaSurface Mining & Reclamation Associ158
ation, Inc.157 and recently reaffirmed in EEOC v. Wyoming,
"[d]emonstrating that these three requirements [established in Usery]
are met does not. . .guarantee that a Tenth Amendment challenge to
congressional commerce power action will succeed. There are situations in which the nature of the federal interest advanced may be such
that it justifies state submission."' 15 9 The compelling nature of the federal interest in protecting consumers from unfair or deceptive acts or
practices surely justifies the limited encroachment on state interests entailed in regulating the conduct of individual attorneys in the debt collection field. Congress made extensive references to the high social cost
of debt collection abuses, 60 a cost that is aggravated when the harrassed debtor does not have a private right of action under the FDCPA
16
and tort remedies are uncertain. '
Is Federal Regulation Necessary?
Assuming that the FTC has the authority to investigate attorneys
and initiate enforcement actions against them for abusive debt collection practices, either through the FDCPA or FTCA section 5, the next
question is whether exercise of the authority is a necessary and appropriate means of protecting consumers from such practices.
The FTC is mandated to act when "it shall appear. . .[to be in]
the interest of the public,"' 62 but like other agencies it is constrained by
limited resources and cannot act upon all instances of unfair practices.
Rather, the agency attempts to make enforcement choices that ensure
maximum public benefit from the resources expended. Consequently,
its case selection criteria should include such pragmatic considerations
as: 1) the prevalence of the practices; 2) the nature and extent of the
156. Id at 402.
157. 452 U.S. 264, 288 n.29 (1981).
158. 103 S.Ct. 1054, 1061 (1983).
159. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 n.29.
160. See infra notes 170-71 & accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 172-79 & accompanying text.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1982).
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consumer injury; 3) the ability of existing institutions, statutory or regulatory schemes, or alternative remedies to correct the problem; and 4)
the potential effectiveness of FTC involvement. An examination of
each of these factors is necessary to determine whether the FTC should
exercise its jurisdiction over an attorney's abusive debt collection
practices.
The Prevalence of the Practices

Unfortunately, there is little published data on the scope of abusive debt collection practices by attorneys. As early as 1968, however,
the New York City Bar Association expressed concern about attorney
involvement in improper collection practices. The Committees on
Grievances and Legal Assistance issued a report 163 in which they
wrote: "The staggering increase in recent years in installment and
other credit sales has had a profound affect [sic] on that segment of the
Bar engaged in collection work. The demands of volume threaten to
destroy all vestiges of professionalism."' 164 The report further noted:

"Complaints against specific attorneys have been investigated, corrective action has been required and detailed records of admonitions for
improper practices are maintained for reference in the event of recurrence. The problem, however, is too extensive to be remedied on a case
165
by case basis."
Despite the best efforts of this author to develop adequate empirical data, at present it is impossible to ascertain the extent or seriousness
of debt collection abuses by attorneys.' 66 Nevertheless, it is known that
163. Improper Collection Practices,23 Rnc. A. B. CiTY N.Y. 441 (1968).
164. Id
165. Id at 443.
166. The author undertook a survey of 53 state disciplinary agencies in May 1983.
Twenty-six agencies responded to the questionaire with varying degrees of information.
Eight agencies said the number of complaints filed against attorneys for allegedly abusive
debt collection practices was not known, four said they had received no complaints, nine
responded that they had received "very few" or "few" complaints, and one said such complaints were "frequent." Three agencies provided no information regarding the number of
complaints, and only one agency provided detailed information. That agency, the Minnesota State Bar Association, reported that for a three and one half year period 132 complaints
were filed, of which 25 were considered valid.
None of the respondents, except Massachusetts, considered abusive debt collection activities by attorneys "a serious problem." The Massachusetts Bar Counsel indicated the
problem was serious, but not widespread. These results are not sufficient to determine the
extent of the problem. The author could find no other specific information or studies regarding attorney debt collectors, but see generally Hearingon H 4617,supranote 22, and
Oversight ofFederalDebt Collection:HearingBefore Subcomm. on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processesof Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 101-17 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing].
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attorneys are engaging in debt collection to an unprecedented degree, 167 and it is common sense that some percentage of these attorneys
will engage in practices that violate the FDCPA or FTCA section 5.168
Moreover, it is likely that the use of attorneys for debt collection will
become more attractive to creditors to the extent that legislatures and
bar associations fail to regulate attorney debt collectors. Indeed, some
attorneys may capitalize on their alleged or actual freedom from federal regulation in an effort to increase their share of the debt collection
market.
The Nature andExtent of Consumer Injury
While the scope of abusive debt collection practices by attorneys is
unknown, the significant consumer injury resulting from debt collection abuses generally is well documented. 69 The congressional hearings leading to passage of the FDCPA established that "[w]hile
unscrupulous debt collectors comprise only a small segment of the in70
dustry, the suffering and anguish they regularly inflict is substantial."
Indeed, the findings and purpose section of the FDCPA states: "Abusive debt collection practices contribute to . . .personal bankruptcies,
to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual
privacy."' 7 ' Such injuries are no less egregious and public policy goals
are no less relevant when attorneys rather than debt collection agencies
are involved.
The Effectiveness of Existing or Alternative Remedies
Despite the significant consumer injury resulting from abusive
debt collection practices, the FTC could rationalize inaction if adequate alternative mechanisms or private remedies were available to
167. See Hearingon H.R. 4617,supra note 22, at 1. A managing partner at the nation's
largest law firm specializing in collection testified at an Oversight of Federal Debt Collection
Hearing that about 5,000 attorneys are handling consumer collection accounts on a regular
basis. Senate Hearing,supra note 166, at 106 (statement of Bernard Landau). This compares to an estimated 4,500 lay collection services in the United States. Hearing on H.R.
4617, supranote 22, at 36. In 1982 the largest collection firm received over 365,000 accounts
with a total dollar value of nearly $356 million. Senate Hearing,supra note 166, at 102. This
is approximately ten times the volume of the average debt collection agency. Hearing on
H.R. 4617, supra note 22, at 36.
168. The FTC has received a small number of complaints about attorney conduct that
would violate the FDCPA if the Act applied. Hearingon H. 4617,supranote22, at 22-23,
38-39.
169. See generaly H.R. REP. No. 131, supra note 84, at 2-4; Senate Hearings on S.656,
supra note 20, at 7.
170. S. REP. No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (1982).
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consumers. Yet only 37 states and the District of Columbia have statutes regulating debt collection practices. 172 Of these, 20 states have
statutes regulating debt collection agencies that specifically exempt attorneys from their coverage.173 Ten additional states exempt attorneys
from statutes governing collection agencies. 174 Of these ten, nine states
have other general statutes under which actions presumably can be

brought for abusive debt collection practices against attorneys. 7 5 Only
one of the ten, Massachusetts, has a statute that specifically includes
attorneys. 176 The statutes of the remaining eight jurisdictions 77 are si-

lent as to whether an action may be brought against an attorney, and
172. S. REP. No. 382, supra note 170, at 2. The Senate Report lists Alabama, Delaware,
Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and South Dakota as those states without debt collection laws. However, South Carolina's Consumer Protection Code of 1976 provides for administrative
enforcement in the form of an injunction to be brought by the Administrator against fraudulent or unconscionable debt collection conduct. 37 S. C. CODE ANN. § 6-Il l(1)(c) (Law CoOp. 1977). Ohio's Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.07-.09
(Page 1979), has been held to apply to debt collection activities. Liggins v. May Co., 44 Ohio
Misc. 81, 337 N.E.2d 816 (1975).
173. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1001(2)(a) (1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-2009(h)
(1979); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6854(a) (West 1975); HAwAii REV. STAT. § 443A-1(4)
(1983); IDAHO CODE § 26-2239 (1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-11-1-2(a) (Bums 1982); MICH.
CoNw. LAws ANN. § 339.901(b)(xi) (West Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 332.32 (West
1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,159(4)(i) (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 649.020(2)(f) (1979); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 45:18-6 (West 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-18-2(B) (1983); N.Y. GEN Bus.
LAw §§ 600-603 (McKinney 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-05-02 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 62-20-103(2) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 12-1-7 (1953); VA. CODE § 54-729.2(c)(i) (1982);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.16.100(3)(c) (1978); W. VA. CODE § 47-16-2 (b)(11) (1980);
Wyo. STAT. § 33-1 1-l01(c)(ii) (1983).
174. See ALASKA STAT. § 08.24.090(b)(1) (1978); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-14-101(2)
(1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-127(b) (West Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I11,
§ 2005(5) (Smith-Hurd 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 572 (1983); MD. COM. LAw
CODE ANN. § 13-104(1) (1983); MASS. GEN LAws ANN. ch. 93, § 24 (West 1972); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 66-49.27 (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7311(h) (Purdon 1973); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 218.04(1)(f) (West 1984).
175. The following statutes are silent about whether an action may be brought against
an attorney: ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.471-.561 (1978); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-1-101 to -12105 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§42-110a to -ll0q (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 ,
§§ 262-272 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, §§ 1.101-7.127 (1983);
MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 14-201 to -204 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-50 to -56
(1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 201-1 to -8 (Purdon Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 427.101-.105 (West 1984).
176. See MAss. GEN LAws ANN. ch. 93, § 49 (West Supp. 1983).
177. See 23 D.C. REG. 1185 (1976); FLA. STAT. §§ 559.55-.78 (1984); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 537.1101-.7103 (West 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3510-:3571 (West 1983); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 358-c:1 to -c:4 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.639-.656 (1983); Tnx.
REV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-11:01 to :11 (Vernon 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 245 la-2462
(Supp. 1982).
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such coverage would be determined by the courts.' 7 8 It thus appears
that state regulation does not generally provide consumers adequate

protection from abusive debt collection practices by attorneys.
Absent a statute that authorizes a private cause of action for debt
collection abuses, consumers must rely on such common law theories as
defamation, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of mental distress, or abuse of process. Proving the elements of these torts or establishing damages is often difficult, 179 however, leaving the injured
consumer without an adequate remedial alternative.
The consumer can also appeal to the state bar association. Bar associations are likely to take the position that the FTC should not police
attorney debt collection activities, as attorneys are subject to state codes
of professional responsibility and disciplinary action by the bar and
courts. 18 0 Unfortunately, the notion that self-regulation affords the
consumer adequate protection may be more optimistic than pragmatic. 181 More than half of the attorney disciplinary agencies responding to the author's survey indicate that no disciplinary action had been
taken against an attorney for engaging in conduct that would constitute
a violation of the FDCPA if engaged in by a debt collector.182 Of the
remaining eleven agencies that reported any disciplinary action, 83 such
action was either in the form of private admonitions' 84 or private reprimands.185 In one state more serious sanctions were imposed for collec178. See, e.g., supra notes 102-21 & accompanying text.
179. See generally Greenfield, Coercive Collection Tactics -An Analysis of the Interests
and the Remedies, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 15-35 (1972). Actions against attorneys are made
even more difficult by the privilege protecting attorneys from liability for defamatory statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding. See generally Mallen & Roberts, The
Liability ofa Litigation Attorney to a Party Opponent, 14 WILLAMETTE L.J. 387 (1978) (protection afforded attorney conduct has expanded beyond defamation suits, and the privilege
has been made applicable to more than just judicial proceedings).
180. See, e.g., Brief of the State Bar of Georgia as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions, XYZ Law Firm v. FTC, 525 F.
Supp. 1235 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Position of State Bar of California (as Amicus Curiae) in Respect to Certain Matters, California Ass'n of Collectors v. Hayt, Hayt & Landau, No. C
296847, (Super. Ct. of Cal., County of Los Angeles) (1983).
181. It is interesting to note that the Senate Committee discussing the inadequacy of
state laws regulating debt collectors wrote: "As an example of ineffective state laws, of the
16 states which regulate by debt collection boards, 12 require by law that a majority of the
board be comprised of debt collectors." S. REP. No. 382, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 2 (1977).
182. See supra note 166.
183. In addition to those agencies identified infra notes 184-86, two agencies did not
specify the nature of the sanctions imposed (New York, 9th Judicial District, and Georgia)
and one reported that an action was pending (New York, 3d Judicial District).
184. Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Colorado, and Vermont.
185. Mississippi, Virginia, and Maine.
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tion practices, but these involved misconduct "substantially more
serious than abusive debt collection practices"' 86 and thus cannot be
regarded as typical.
This apparent lack of disciplinary activity by the responding bar
associations could be attributed to several factors. It may be that lawyers simply are not engaging in abusive debt collection practices, that
the bar associations are lax in disciplining members, or that consumers

are not reporting complaints. A more disturbing explanation is that
present standards of conduct imposed by the bar are inadequate to deal
with the types of debt collection abuses prohibited by the FDCPA and

FTCA section 5.
The inadequacy of state bar regulation results from the fact that
the objectives of the FDCPA and FTCA section 5 differ from those of

the various codes of professional responsibility. For example, they
manifest concern for different consumer interests. Under the FDCPA
187
the "consumer" is defined as the person obligated to pay the debt.
The FDCPA is specifically designed to preserve and protect the dignity
and privacy of the debtor. 88 On the other hand, the principal "consumer" interest recognized by the various codes of professional respon-

who the codes ensure will be ardently
siblity is that of the client,
89

represented by counsel.
Further, FTCA section 5 broadly prohibits any unfair or deceptive
act or practice. The focus of the FTC proceeding is on the alleged conduct and its impact on consumers. Violators may be subject to a cease
and desist order designed to ensure that the practices have been cor186. Minnesota, which also reported that in nine instances warnings were issued and
that thirteen cases were then under investigation.
187. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) (1982).
188. Thus, the statute prohibits conduct that would reveal to others that a debt is owed,
and restricts the times and places at which contact with the debtor and others can be made.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b, 1692c, 1692f(7)-(8) (1982).
189. For example, Canon 7 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
states: "A lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law." The
Code also provides that a lawyer should resolve any doubts about the bounds of the law in
favor of his client. See MODEL CODE, supra note 57, at EC 7-3. EC 7-10 does provide,
however, that "the duty of a lawyer to represent his client with zeal does not militate against
his concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal process
and to avoid the infliction of needless harm."
In August of 1983 the ABA adopted a new set of Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
The new model Rules include a section entitled "Transactions with Persons Other Than
Clients," which appears to address some of the concerns discussed here. See MODEL RULES,
supra note 57, at Rule 4.1-A. Substantively, however, the new Rules do not provide significantly more protection in the area of debt collection practices. References to the new Rules
will be made when appropriate.
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rected so that no further harm occurs. Because the FTCA is designed to
prevent injury, rather than punish wrongdoers, intent is irrelevant and
actual deception need not be proven.190 In contrast, the codes of pro-

fessional responsibility merely set out the minimum level of conduct
for attorneys and provide the basis for disciplinary action and sanctions. 191 Although it is said that the purpose of disciplinary proceedings
is to protect the public and the courts from persons unfit to practice
law, not to punish the offending attorney, 192 the focus is nevertheless on
the attorneys right to practice law rather than on the harm to the consumer. Intent and blameworthiness are viewed as important factors in
any decision to impose sanctions, 193 and disciplinary actions have been
labelled "adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature."' 94 The
consumer is provided no direct relief in such actions.
It is not surprising, then, that practices that are unlawful under the
FDCPA or FTCA section 5 may not violate the codes of professional

responsibility. Certainly some of the more egregious practices prohibited by the FDCPA may be proscribed by the general language of the
bar codes. For example, the use or threat of use of violence or other
criminal means to harm a person, her reputation, or her property is
conduct prohibited by the FDCPA that also would "adversely reflect
on [the attorney's] fitness to practice law" under the Model Code of
Professional Responsiblity. 95 Moreover, certain conduct is expressly
190. See FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963). The FDCPA also
imposes liability for any failure to comply without regard to the violator's intent. National
Consumer Law Center, Debt Collection Harrassment 62 (1982). "[T]he extent to which the
debt collector's noncompliance was intentional" is a factor, however, in determining the
amount of statutory damages awarded. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b) (1982).
191. See MODEL CODE, supra note 57, (Preliminary Statement).
192. In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347, 349 (7th Cir. 1970).
193. The new Rules also provide in the preamble that failure to comply with an obligation imposed by a rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The Rules caution,
however, that any disciplinary assessment should take into account the fact that lawyers
must often act on uncertain or incomplete evidence. The Rules also presuppose that decisions regarding discipline or severity of sanctions depend on all the circumstances, such as
willfulness and seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors, and previous violations.
See MODEL RULES, supra note 57, (Preamble).
194. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968). Several state decisions similarly characterized their disciplinary proceedings, but the more accepted position appears to be that such
proceedings are sui generis - neither criminal nor civil in nature. ABA/BNA Lawyers
Manual on Professional Conduct § 101:2101 (1984).
195. MODEL CODE, supra note 57, at DR 1-102(A)(6). See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Kissel, 497 Pa. 467, 470, 442 A.2d 217, 220 (1982) (use of intimidation or threats).
Seealso Kansas v. Zeigler, 217 Kan. 748,753, 538 P.2d 643, 647 (1975) (use of "Joy of Being
Sued" letter). The new Model Rules define "misconduct" as "commit[ting] a criminal act
that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects." MODEL RULES, supra note 57, at Rule 8.4(b).
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prohibited by parallel provisions in the FDCPA and the bar codes,
such as prohibitions of direct contact with the debtor once counsel has
been retained,1 96 threats of criminal prosecution, 197 and imposition of
unlawful fees or charges. 198
Nevertheless, some practices unlawful under the FDCPA may not
be actionable under seemingly parallel provisions of the codes. For example, the FDCPA prohibits the use of any "false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of
any debt."' 99 The codes might appear to cover the same misconduct in
directing that a lawyer not "[e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation" 200 or "[k]nowingly make a false
statement of law or fact."'201 Despite the apparent similarity in language, the standards for measuring prohibited conduct under each are
actually quite different and produce different results.
The FDCPA standard of "false, deceptive, or misleading" is the
same standard used in the FTCA, 20 2 and as such has been interpreted
by the courts by reference to section 5 cases. 20 3 Those cases consistently have held that actual deception need not be shown, and that
"[r]epresentations merely having a 'capacity to deceive' are unlawful. ''2° 4 Moreover, federal district courts, in determining whether a
statement made by a debt collector is false, deceptive, or misleading
under the FDCPA, have held that the court "should look not to the
196. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) (1982) with MODEL CODE, supra note 57, at DR 7104(A)(1). MODEL RULE 4.2 is substantially identical to DR 7-104(A)(1).
197. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(4),(5) (1982) with MODEL CODE, supra note 57, at DR
7-105(A). But see Decato's Case, 117 N.H. 885, 887, 379 A.2d 825, 826-27 (1977), in which
the court held that without a demand for payment, the mere mention of the possibility of
filing charges against a debtor does not violate DR 7-105(A). The court held that an element
of the offense is proof that the person charged acted with a purpose soleyto obtain an advantage in a civil matter. Id. There is no such specific prohibition of threats of criminal prosecution in the Model Rules.
198. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(l) (1982) with MODEL CODE, supra note 57, at DR 2106(A). This section of the Model Code is actually intended to address illegal or excessive
fees charged to the client. There is no such specific prohibition in the Model Rules. Fees
generally are discussed in MODEL RULE 1.5.
199. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (1982).
200. MODEL CODE, supra note 57, at DR 1-102(A)(4). MODEL RULE 8.4(c) is substantially identical to DR 1-102(A)(4).
201. MODEL CODE, supra note 57, at DR 7-102(A)(5). MODEL RULE 4.1(a) is substantially similar to DR 7-102(A)(5). It reads: "In the course of representing a client, a lawyer
shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact to a third person."
202. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(1), 55(a) (1982).
203. See Wright v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 591, 599 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 864, 870 (D.N.D. 1981).
204. Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944). See
FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963).
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most sophisticated readers but to the least." 20 5 The courts typically
have found a violation if "debtors on the low side of reasonable capacread into the
ity who read a given notice or hear a given 0statement
' 2 6
message oppressiveness, falsehood or threat.
In section 5 cases it is not necessary to prove an intent to
deceive. 20 7 Good or bad faith is not determinative of liability under the
FTCA, 20 8 and it is not even required that the maker of the representa20 9
tion know that the representation is false or misleading.
The FDCPA does provide, however, an affirmative defense in that
"a debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under
this subchapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona
fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably
adapted to avoid any such error. '210 Yet one district court construing
this section held that even though the defendant corporation had
shown that the violation was not intentional, it was nevertheless liable
because it failed to show that the violation resulted from bona fide
error.2 11
The seemingly parallel provision of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility uses the terms "dishonesty," "deceit," "misrepresentation," and "fraud" - all strong perjoratives - as standards for
determining misconduct. 2t 2 The conduct proscribed by this code provision has been characterized as "grossly improper conduct" that is "sufficient to evidence lack of the requisite good moral character required
205. Bingham, 505 F. Supp. 864, 870 (D.N.D. 1981) (quoting Exposition Press, Inc. v.
FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 873 (2d Cir. 1961)).
206. Id at 871. The court in Blackwell v. Professional Business Serv., 526 F. Supp. 535
(N.D. Ga. 1981), expressly rejected the Bingham test as too stringent and held that a court
must measure the alleged violation of the FDCPA by looking to "whether a reasonable
consumer would be deceived or misled by particular language." Id at 537-38. The Wright
court examined both approaches and concluded that the standard applied in Bingham was
the appropriate measure of the tendency to deceive and expressly rejected the Blackwell
standard "[t]o the extent that .. .[it afforded] less stringent protection." Wright, 548 F.
Supp. at 600.
t
207. See Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976), cer . denied,430 U.S.
983 (1977); FTC v. Sterling Drug,Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963); Gimbel Bros., Inc. v.
FTC, 116 F.2d 578, 579 (2d Cir. 1941).
208. See Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1968); Montgomery Ward
& Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1967).
209. See Gimbel Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 116 F.2d 578, 579 (2d Cir. 1941).
210. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (1982).
211. Bingham, 505 F. Supp. 864, 874 (D.N.D. 1981).
212. MODEL CODE, supra note 57, at DR 1-102(A)(4).
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of all members of the bar. 21 3 Each of these terms except "dishonesty"
is a tort concept that entails specific elements of proof and at least implies a measure of blameworthiness and bad faith on the part of the
maker of the misrepresentation. 2 14 While it may not be necessary to
prove each of these tort causes of action in a disciplinary proceeding
involving DR 1-102(A)(4), one must assume that intent would be a
highly relevant factor. All this, plus the fact that the majority of disciplinary proceedings require a "clear and convincing" standard of
proof,2 1 5 suggests that misconduct under the Code may be far more
difficult to prove than a violation of the FDCPA or FTCA.
Similarly, Model Code disciplinary rule 7-102(a)(5), which provides that "[i]n his representation of a client, a lawyer
shall not...
[kInowingly make a false statement of law or fact, 216 may not provide
much additional relief due to its scienter requirement. In a Massachusetts disciplinary proceeding,2 1 7 the court reviewed a recommendation
by the Board of Bar Overseers for public censure of an attorney who, in
a collection letter, allegedly made an improper statement of law that
was misleading and deceptive.2 18 Although the court disagreed with
the Board's interpretation of the letter, the court admitted that the letter
was ambiguous and that "ambiguity in such matters is to be
avoided. 2 1 9 Nevertheless, the court refused to apply sanctions against
the attorney on the ground that the language in the prohibition was too
213. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 336 (1974).
214. In proving a cause of action sounding in deceit, misrepresentation, or fraud, one
must show that the representation was a material representation of fact known to be false (or
made with the knowledge that there was insufficient information on which to base the representation), made with the intent to cause the other party to act in reliance, and on which the
other party justifiably relies to his detriment. See, e.g., Coffin v. Dodge, 146 Me. 3, 76 A.2d
541 (1950); Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952). See general REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525-549 (1977).
215. ABA/BNA Lawyers Manual on Professional Conduct § 101:2102 (1984).
216. MODEL CODE, supra note 57, at DR 7-102(a)(5) (emphasis added).
217. In re Robert Singer, 1 Mass. Atty. Discipline Reports 263 (1978).
218. The representation at issue was the following:
Your failure to pay this judgment in full, or to contact my office within five days
from date with an arrangement to pay this judgment will result in the judicial sale
of your home, automobile, or any other personal property necessary to satisfy the
judgment. This action will be costly to you, as well as embarrassing. I hope that
you will not force me to take this very drastic action.
Id at 266.
219. Id at 267. Under the FTCA "[i]t is a well settled principle that advertisements
may be deceptive if they have a tendency and capacity to convey misleading impressions to
consumers even though other nonmisleading interpretations may also be possible or even
likely." Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting In re Chrysler
Corp., 87 F.T.C. 719, 737 (1976)).
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vague. 220 Thus, the distinctions between the elements of a cause of action under either of the federal statutes and one brought under the
Model Code's anti-misrepresentation provisions may contribute to the
bar associations' inability to effectively cope with lawyer misconduct of
221
this nature.
The Model Code is deficient in other respects. For example, the
FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from communicating with the
debtor's employer or with any other third person except, under specific
restrictions, to acquire location information.222 This provision is one of
the act's most important protections, 223 yet there is no parallel provision in the various codes of professional responsibility. Several of the
bar disciplinary agencies responding to the author's survey did not believe that employer contact would be a violation of the applicable state
code. 224 In this situation one might apply Model Code disciplinary

rule 7-102(A)(1), which provides that a lawyer shall not take "action on
behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another." 225
However, the requirement that the action be knowingly undertaken
merely to harass would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove since
220. The court reasoned:
Lawyers are entitled to due process of law before they are censured, and to comprehensible specification of what is permitted and what is forbidden. . . I do not
believe the language quoted [that of DR 7-102(a)(5), see supra note 216 & accompanying text] gives adequate warning that the ambiguity of the letter was forbidden
in the circumstances of this case. Indeed the hearing committee did not find and I
am not persuaded that the respondent "knowingly" created the ambiguity.
In re Robert Singer, 1 Mass. Atty. Discipline Rep. at 267.
221. The FTCA also provides that the failure to disclose material information to consumers may constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 52, 55(a)(1)
(1982); Simeon Management Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 1978). Conversely, as the comment to MODEL RULE 4.1 notes, a lawyer, though required to be truthful,
"generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts." MODEL
RULES, supranote 57, at Rule 4.1 comment.
222. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b, 1692c(b) (1982).
223. See S. REP. No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977); see also NATIONAL CONSUMER
LAW CENTER, DEBT COLLECTION HARASSMENT 24 (1982).
224. Pennsylvania, Vermont, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, and Connecticut responded that
employer contact would not violate their codes of professional responsibility. Georgia, New
York (9th Judicial District), West Virginia, and Wyoming responded that it would depend
on the circumstances. Virginia, Nebraska, and Texas said they were "not sure," Minnesota
responded "possibly," and New Jersey responded "probably, but no case law." Colorado,
Maine, Mississppi, and Tennessee believed employer contact could be a violation of their
codes. Seven of the survey respondents did not answer this question.
225. MODEL CODE, supra note 57, at DR 7-102(A)(1). MODEL RULE 4.4, entitled Respect for Rights of Third Persons, provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use
means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person."
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there may be otherwise valid purposes in contacting an employer about
226
the employee's debt.
The FDCPA also provides the debtor with important rights that
are not provided by the various codes of professional responsibility.
Under the FDCPA, the consumer has a right to receive a notice concerning the amount of the obligation, his right to dispute the debt, and
his right to require verification of the debt by the collector. 227 The consumer also has a right to stop a collector from contacting him if the
consumer so notifies the collector in writing.228 Most importantly, perhaps, the FDCPA gives the consumer a private right of action. 229 The
action may be brought in any federal district court without regard to
the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction. 230 In addition to actual damages, the court may impose additional
damages up to $1,000.231 The successful plaintiff is also entitled to
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. 232 The Model Code of Professional Responsiblity, on the other hand, states that it does not undertake to define standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional
misconduct. 233 The new proposed Rules of Professional Conduct are
even clearer. They provide that "violation of a Rule should not give
rise to a cause of action nor should it create any presumption that a
legal duty has been breached. . . .They are not designed to be a basis
'234
for civil liability.
All of these distinctions support the contention that attorneys are
not under the same restrictions as debt collectors, and that the consumer is not adequately protected when the codes of professional re226. One such valid purpose even permitted under the FDCPA is to acquire location
information about the consumer. However, the FDCPA closely regulates the form and content of permissible contacts, see 15 U.S.C. 1692b, and requires that the debt collector "observe certain guidelines." S. REP. No. 382, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1977). An attorney
seeking location information would not be subject to the same specific restrictions. But see
Comm. on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Michelson, 345 N.W.2d 112 (Iowa 1984), in
which a letter from an attorney to the debtor's commanding officer was found to be violative
of DR 7-102(A). The court wrote that "although the letter was primarily geared to obtaining
payment of the debt, it was obvious to the attorney that the letter would harass and maliciously injure the debtor." Id at 117.
227. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (1982).
228. Id § 1692c(c).
229. Id § 1692k.
230. Id. § 1692k(d).
231. Id § 1692k(a)(1), (2)(A).
232. Id § 1692k(a)(3).

233.
234.

MODEL CODE,

MODEL RULES,

supra note 57, (Preliminary Statement).
supranote 57, (Scope).
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sponsibility rather than the federal statutes are used as the standard for
evaluating attorney conduct.
The PotentialEffectiveness of FTC Involvement

Despite the inadequacy of these other potential consumer remedies, it is unrealistic to depend exclusively on the FTC to vigorously
enforce standards of conduct in the legal profession. Limited resources
should dictate that the FTC concentrate its enforcement efforts in those
areas that affect the greatest number of consumers in the most significant way.
Clearly, the activities of a small or even medium-sized law firm
should not attract the same kind of attention from the FTC as a national advertising or product defect case, or even a case concerning the
collection activities of a major retail creditor or finance company.
From a political standpoint, it is also unlikely that the FTC will become active in the area of attorney debt collection. Given the present
anti-regulatory climate and the accompanying hostility directed specifically at the FTC,235 one can expect that the agency will avoid taking
controversial positions that could embroil it in further battles to curtail
its jurisdiction.
Moreover, just as section 5 of the FTCA was not entirely effective
when used against independent debt collection agencies, 23 6 it may not
be effective against small law firms or sole practitioners. Without the
specific standards imposed by the FDCPA, and the availability of civil
penalties and private causes of action provided by that act,237 FTC involvement may not significantly curtail the unlawful practices of attorney debt collectors.
A Proposal
Consumers deserve the best practicable protection from abusive
debt collection practices, regardless of the professional credentials of
the person collecting the debt. If the bar associations are to retain their
full authority over the practice of law in their jurisdictions, they must
235. See, e.g., Advertising Age, Dec. 3, 1979, at 20, col. 1 (editorial); Wash. Post, Feb. 6,
1980, at A18, col.1 (editorial); N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1980, at A26, col. 1 (editorial). The
success of this business opposition is reflected in the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, §§ 11, 19, 94 Stat. 374, 378-79, 391-92 (1980), which
restricts FTC authority in some of the above mentioned areas and includes a provision for a
legislative veto. Id at 393.
236. See supra note 86 & accompanying text.
237. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k, 16921(1982).
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exercise their authority over this increasingly important facet of the legal profession. The bar can protect both its prerogatives and consumers
by subjecting attorneys to the same stringent standards imposed on
debt collectors generally. The bar agencies should expressly adopt, as
part of their codes of professional responsibility, the standards of conduct and affirmative obligations required of debt collectors by the
FDCPA. The bar should further use all of the sanctions at its disposal
to discipline those attorneys who violate these provisions.
An active, aggressive state bar disciplinary agency would be the
most effective enforcement mechanism and deterrent in the area of
abusive attorney debt collection practices. The bar already has the authority and the procedural mechanisms it needs to investigate and adjudicate complaints of professional misconduct, and has at its disposal
238
punitive sanctions that are of great consequence to its members.
Lawyers are particularly qualified by their training to analyze and apply standards of conduct, and the professional communications network can quickly and effectively spread information about such
standards as well as news of actions taken against those who fail to
meet those standards. The bar is in the best position to understand the
intricacies and demands of everyday practice and the tensions that result from the lawyer's often conflicting allegiances to the client, the
courts, and society. Finally, whereas the FTC is likely to focus its limited resources on large urban areas where its impact may be greatest,
the state bar associations, some of which have multiple regional disciplinary agencies, have the ability to infiltrate the grassroots of all fifty
states. It thus makes sense for the bar to exercise the primary responsibility for control over the debt collection practices of its members.
If this proposal is adopted, several benefits would ensue. Consumers would be afforded better and more certain protection, which would
also enhance the tarnished public image of the profession; attorneys
engaged in collection activities would be subject to the same restrictions
as other collectors, thereby losing any unfair competitive advantage
that may have resulted from their exemption under the FDCPA;239 and
238. Disbarment or even suspension would most likely have a greater deterrent impact
than money damages or a fine.
239. The debt collection trade associations and individual agencies have lobbied intensively to amend federal and state law to include attorneys, in order to prevent this competitive advantage. An amendment to the FDCPA introduced by Rep. Annunzio on January
24, 1984 would remove the attorney exemption entirely. See Hearingon H.R 4617, supra
note 22; see also supra note 61 (regarding efforts in California). The Senate is considering a
similar amendment proposed by Sen. Slade Gorton, contained in the Financial Services
Competitive Equity Act. See S.2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1103 (1984). In May 1984 a bill
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the bar would retain its control over the practice of law and attorney
discipline in the face of mounting pressure for federal intervention.
Most importantly, perhaps, this proposal will protect the individual attorney, who presently may be caught between concerns about
questionable conduct and his or her primary duty to the client.240 Specific standards of conduct for collection work incorporated as part of
the Model Code would provide needed guidance as to ethical practices
and afford the attorney a basis for refusing to engage in questionable
activities without running the risk of being challenged for failure to
adequately represent the client's interests.
If the bar voluntarily adopts the provisions of the FDCPA as the
standard for measuring the conduct of attorney debt collectors, and enforces those standards vigorously and consistently, federal intervention
will not be necessary. If the state bar associations fail to regulate their
members, however, the FTC can and should exercise its power under
the FDCPA and section 5 of the FTCA to protect the public.

was signed into law in Maryland which amended the Maryland statute regulating debt collection agencies to include those operated by attorneys MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 323 (1984).
See Hearing on H.R. 4617, supra note 22, at 115-21.
240. MODEL CODE, supranote 57, at EC 7-3 provides that when such conflicts occur, the
attorney is to resolve any doubts in favor of the client.

